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China pe rspect i vesEditorial
A Challenge to the Dominant
Portrait of Xi Jinping
DOROTHY J .  SOLINGER
Last October, at the 19
th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, Xi
Jinping—General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, Presi-
dent of the nation, and Commander-in-Chief of the military—bel-
lowed out a clear call to heed the momentous mission he has charted out
for the Party (and, implicitly, for himself):
The Chinese nation (…) has stood up, grown rich, and become
strong—and it now embraces the brilliant prospects of rejuvenation
(…). It will be an era that sees China moving closer to centre stage
and making greater contributions to mankind (…).
Thus, he continued:
(...) let us get behind the strong leadership of the Party and engage
in a tenacious struggle.
He left no doubt that that strong leadership was to be directly under his
own personal command. (1)
It is too early at this point for Xi and his governance to have received in-
depth scholarly attention, certainly too soon for research on what should
be his especially consequential second term (and perhaps beyond), just now
beginning as of this writing. (2) But outstanding features of his rule during
his first term have been apparent.
Xi has garnered such an outpouring of journalistic attention—aptly
dubbed of late “Chairman of Everything” (3) —that he would seem to need
no further scrutiny. Indeed, the man now holds a startling total of 12 top
positions in leadership bodies, five of which were invented since his taking
power in late 2012 (or, perhaps that were invented for him). (4) He has placed
himself (or has been placed?) in charge of the economy, in a move that
eroded the authority of the Premier, the official who in the past managed
this sphere of work; he has also reorganised both the military and—at the
March 2018 session of the National People’s Congress—the cabinet. In the
wake of that People’s Congress meeting, a number of aspects of Xi’s rule
have become ubiquitous representations seen repeatedly by anyone who
reads about China. These features are: an overweening reach for power and
control; a now unquestioned capacity to legitimate his programs and poli-
cies by reference to an inchoate “China Dream”; and a near obsessive
drive—distinguished by a high degree of repressiveness not seen in some
40 years in China—to keeping society quiescent.
Academic commentators, as well as those in the press, point to Xi’s
achievements in undoing a slew of customary practices—norms, perhaps
even institutions—laid into place some 35 years earlier by prominent states-
man Deng Xiaoping in the interest of halting Mao-style rule: these include
collective decision-making and rule at the top; division of realms of authority
within the leadership; the separation of party from state; standardised ap-
proaches to fostering the next generation of the political elite; limited terms
of office and an end to lifetime tenure among senior officials. (5) It would ap-
pear that he has had his way in foreign diplomatic, military, and external
economic affairs, marked by forays into the militarisation of the South China
Sea; the creation of the Belt and Road Initiative already spanning Asia and
Central Asia and reaching into the Middle East and Europe; and his eye-grab-
bing conversations with North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-un. 
He has managed to get his name and his “thought,” “Xi Jinping Thought
on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” inserted into the
Party Constitution last October during his lifetime, an honour previously
bestowed only on Mao Zedong. A few months later, in March this year, the
state Constitution as well had his name and thought inscribed as one of the
first amendments to this document in 14 years, even as a new elimination
of the norm of term limits for the Presidency threatened to saddle the na-
tion with a chief in charge until the end of his days. Thus, Xi has now won
the moniker in the Western press of “Emperor for Life.” (6) Some writers have
viewed parts of his behaviour as of a piece with Mao, in Xi’s cult of person-
ality, his autocracy, and his willingness to rewrite established patterns and
precepts. (7) Overall, he has centralised and consolidated the power of the
Communist Party even as he has seemingly tied up his own leadership for
the very long term. But how novel are his modes of action, after all? This
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special issue poses that query and arrives at some different interpretations
from those we see everywhere in print.
For there has been little scholarship that has looked at the nuts and bolts
of how these characterisations actually play out in daily affairs. Nor have
either scholars or columnists scrutinised how or why other top Chinese lead-
ers might have selected this person to govern the country; they have not
probed the extent to which Xi’s prominence really dominates daily matters
in new ways or the degree to which his hold on power truly undermines
Party conventions. In other words, there has been little that has questioned
the platitudes or dug below what is apparent. (8)
The papers in this collection challenge this boilerplate delineation in sev-
eral ways. In the first place, the pieces breathe life into what have become
truisms for students and observers of today’s China. They do so as they show
how the several urges and objectives we encounter in writing about Xi
have–or have not–become instantiated in some of the performances of of-
ficialdom. They look not at generalities but at specific areas of politics, and
they document a few of the implications and the blowback (in religion)
they have engendered. But secondly, and more critically, they interrogate
the measure of Xi’s capacity to innovate, as opposed to his ability to inten-
sify. Readers will find that these essays provoke some reconsideration of
the role this new “helmsman” (in the mode of Mao), as Xi has been termed,
has in fact been able to chisel out in his five-plus years in power so far. (9)
The authors of the papers, all political scientists, are newly-minted scholars,
recent recipients of the Ph.D. But while they are up-to-date in their analyses
and conversant with methodologies and approaches of the present, each of
them displays a firm grasp of the history of the field of Chinese politics and
of politics in China as they have transpired over the decades. In the first paper
here, Joseph Torigian has combed through much memoir literature penned
by members of Xi’s cohort and autobiographical accounts by Xi himself to
fashion a portrait that showcases a set of his essential traits. The other three
contributors investigate the manner in which Xi’s administration is handling
Party institutions, major state firms, and religious observance, respectively.
Each of them alludes to perceived weaknesses and shortcomings in the rule
of the previous Party leader and Premier, Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, respec-
tively, whose governance is now seen as having corroded the Party’s author-
ity through slackness, corruption, and internal disarray. 
In the first of these other three studies, Dimitar Gueorguiev queries the
claims that Xi has elevated himself at the expense of the Party, as he pro-
vides a compelling evaluation of Xi’s moves and demonstrates that they
amount to less of a shake-up than is commonly assumed. Next, Wendy
Leutert shows how the new regime has borrowed old tools of the trade in
managing its premier state-owned enterprises, if doing so with a stronger,
more insistent hand. And third and last of this set, Kuei-min Chang surveys
the content and effects of new regulations on religion. Taken together, these
papers show Xi Jinping as a complex character who has been better at shak-
ing up customs than he has been at creating novel or innovative modes of
rule. In short, they paint this chief as tweaking but not undoing norms, build-
ing upon and intensifying the dominance of, but not destroying, institutions
long in place. There are even hints that Xi may be cautious and perhaps, in
some sense, conservative instead of a pathbreaker. (10) One could note here
that he is principally aiming to buttress the primacy of the Communist
Party, surely nothing more than the number one aim of all the top leaders.
Torigian’s (11) deeply researched inspection of Xi’s formative childhood and
teenage years focuses on his relations with, treatment by, and stigma lent
him by Mao’s ouster of his father, the latter-day reformer Xi Zhongxun, who
was purged from the Party in 1962, when Xi was just nine years old. Torigian
also chronicles Xi’s experiences in middle school, where he was bullied; his
fond connections with peasants in the countryside when he served as a
sent-down youth in the Cultural Revolution; and his difficulties with the
Red Guards—who ostracised him for his father having been ousted by
Mao—during that period. Torigian’s objective in his historical quest is to in-
terrogate and speculate about how key episodes and ordeals tested and
shaped the future politician. His conclusion is that the various encounters
he describes steeled the young leader-to-be, moulding him into a person
with conviction and a sense of mission and idealism, yet one still pragmatic
about how to reach his goals and in some ways even cautious, some of
which features of his personality have indeed come to the surface in his
present position.
Moving along to the three papers that research and analyse how Xi’s gov-
ernance is influencing critical aspects of rule, they all share a view that Xi
is set to rectify what now is roundly regarded as a time of stalemate, Party
fragmentation, and lack of discipline, both within the Party and in society-
at-large. Gueorguiev addresses Xi’s response to these weaknesses, but he
counters accounts that assert that Xi has shattered Party norms. In doing
so, he draws upon theorising on authoritarian political regimes. (12) Gue-
orguiev employs this literature to help him fathom the motives behind Xi’s
actions and to figure out what they may mean for the balance between
this man and the Party. In the main, he directs his reasoning toward grap-
pling with the issue of whether or not what many have presumed was an
ongoing institutionalisation of politics at the summit in China has been in-
terrupted or thrown aside. He decides that Xi has taken advantage of the
rules in place to further his own power and install his own protégés more
than he has disrupted them. As an aside, one might note here that Xi did
resort to the use of both the Party and state constitutions to build his own
prestige and to do away with the President’s term limits, rather than just
announcing these steps by means of personal fiat.
Gueorguiev contends that instead of ignoring the Party’s age limits (which,
incidentally, were put into place informally and extra-constitutionally, as
new “institutions” by prior Party chiefs, who invented off-the-books regu-
lations precisely to eliminate their rivals), Xi has used them to manipulate
successions to come. (13) For instance, he apparently acquiesced to the re-
tirement of his ally, Wang Qishan (who at the age of 69 could no longer re-
main on the Party’s Politburo Standing Committee according to the age
norm), to appoint him Vice President, an ill-defined post whose duties could
be fulfilled as Xi (or Wang) might wish. Observers have also commented for
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Editorial
several years now that Xi arranged the last (2012) leadership line-up such
that—if now standard practices on age and term limits are to be re-
spected—there was no one positioned to serve as his successor.
Gueorguiev has a fresh reply to the charge that Xi has dispensed with
precedent to build his own power. This is that Xi’s appointments, retire-
ments, and corruption-related purges have enabled him to clear openings
for his own followers and loyalists now and in the years to come. Moreover,
Gueorguiev argues that as of fall 2017 Xi had already manoeuvred years in
advance to ensure that his own faction would dominate both the Politburo
and the Standing Committee at the 19th Party Congress. He also surmises
that Xi’s centralisation and consolidation of power may well have been un-
dertaken in consultation with (or even at the initiative of) his peers, who
could consensually have agreed that internecine competition among lead-
ership groups was interfering with steady rule, and that an especially strong
arm would be needed to handle such ongoing obstacles to governance as
pervasive bribery and malfeasance, pollution, and government debt. This ac-
count of Xi’s bending of the norms begs a rethinking of the measure of what
have been seen as his reversals.
Wendy Leutert’s paper on core central-level state-sector firms offers a
telling, fine-grained scrutiny of the mechanisms that Xi’s regime has em-
ployed to reclaim and enhance the Party’s hold over the economy. She
reached her findings through the use of policy documents and an original
dataset that details the careers and treatment of central state-owned en-
terprise leaders, and she employs both recent scholarship on the state’s
management of the state sector and older research on bureaucratic politics
to situate her study. (14) Her bottom line is that, rather than inventing new
modes of bringing major firms and their management to heel, the present
power system has simply strengthened techniques long in use: leading small
groups; cadre control (in particular, joint appointments and frequent rota-
tion of managers); stronger Party committees within enterprises; and cam-
paign-style control (especially Xi’s battle against corruption). Leutert directs
her findings to the now vast literature that asks how the communist regime
in China has persisted through trials, i.e., the work on “authoritarian re-
silience.” Her answer is to show how what she labels “institutional flexibil-
ity” has enabled current leaders to diminish the clout of bureaucratic actors
that prevailed under the previous regime even while bolstering arrange-
ments borrowed from the past.
The last piece in the set, by Kuei-min Chang, also notes what Xi (and other
leaders) have tagged as inadequacies in the domestic state of affairs under
Hu and Wen, in her case with regard to potential foreign influences, Western
ideas, and religious subversion. Her work draws on studies of China’s “united
front” program (Groot 2016; Van Slyke 1967), of which religion is a part, on
other work on current religious policy in China (Palmer 2009), and on a
range of Chinese studies of religion under Xi.
Like Gueorgueiv and Leutert, she points to what has been identified among
top leaders as slack guidance in this realm under Hu Jintao, resulting in what
they worry spells danger for the country’s national security, and perhaps for
regime survival. Chang mentions Xi’s line in his speech at the October 2017
Party Congress about “fine traditional Chinese culture,” reliance on which he
deemed necessary to China’s rise. But his tack in rectifying the neglect of
this culture, Chang shows, has been just to issue new “Regulations on Reli-
gious Affairs” that took effect early in 2018 and which, she explains, merely
“preserved [if] intensified extant bureaucratic oversight.” Under Xi, the Party’s
general reaction to the spiritual challenge has been increased intervention
into religious observance and its effort, on Xi’s command, to “sinicise” religion
(meaning to promote indigenous or indigenised religions) in the hope of re-
moving the commercialisation, extremism, and Western values that Xi
thought to be corroding Chinese ideological and social control. Contrary to
his intentions, in the absence of a fundamental overhaul, Xi has merely forced
undesirable practices underground or incited clashes between religious ad-
herents and the police, some of them violent.
These four studies, then, amount to a brand new perspective, a package
of revisionist insights, as to how Xi and his government are operating in
China today. What they accomplish is to speak back to the stereotyped ac-
count that presents his reign as something novel in the nation, or at least
as a performance the country has not confronted since the days of Mao
Zedong. Instead, these authors say, respectively, that Xi’s personality and
the modes of governance under his rule are more complex than as usually
sketched and that his styles of rule could be less an attack on institutional
patterns and procedures than people have heretofore believed. 
Rather, what is happening is that Xi is engaged in an exploitation of these
tried approaches for his own purposes (or, perhaps, for the purposes of the
current Party elite as a whole). Moreover, his treatment of the nub of the
economy and of the rituals of belief amount to nothing more than a harder,
beefed-up turn to tools of the recent past. We hope that this introduction
to examples of this viewpoint will inspire further close looks at particular
policies and programs to test it out.
z Dorothy J. Solinger is Professor Emerita of Political Science at the
University of California, Irvine. 
University of California, 31 Murasaki Street, Irvine, CA 92617
(dorjsoli@uci.edu).
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